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Abstract
The language of the law has been a favourite subject of investigation for both legal professionals and linguists for more 
than a decade now. Linguists, for instance, have paid increasing attention to the interplay of precise and fl exible terms 
in legal drafting, and language variation across the genres of legal discourse. Among the latter, judgments have been 
discussed as a case in point by argumentation scholars, although the linguistic components of judicial argumentative 
discourse have often been overlooked. In the light of this, the aim of this paper is to carry out a corpus-based analysis 
of the open-ended category of reformulation markers as outstanding discursive items of judicial discourse in two 
comparable corpora of authentic judgments issued by two different courts of last resort, namely the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities and Ireland’s Supreme Court. By combining a qualitative with a quantitative analysis, the 
study shows that reformulation markers tend to activate a variety of discursive confi gurations across the two courts. 
Hence, data reveal that reformulation strengthens the quality of both judicial narrative, as it were – as is clear from its 
deployment in clarifying the normative background and specifying the factual framework of disputes – and at once 
judicial argument, when judges characterise, refi ne or grade reported arguments/interpretations or they wish to make 
their reasoning more solid and convincing. 
1. Introduction
The language of the law has been a favourite subject of investigation for more than a decade now. 
What is it that fascinates lawyers about language and linguists about the law? As far as the legal 
profession is concerned, one almost inevitably goes back to the early 1960s, when Mellinkoff 
(1963: vi) straightforwardly argued that “the law is a profession of words”. He was willing to em-
phasise that the actual substance of legal norms lies in the linguistic formulation they eventually 
take: the binding nature of legal rules is inextricably linked with the wording of norms and the 
related interpretation. 
Roughly ten years later, Scarpelli (1976: 425-430) stressed the primary importance of the lin-
guistic dimension entailed by the study of judicial argumentation, by distinguishing between the 
two pivotal functions of language in the adjudicating process: descriptive, as regards the asser-
tion of facts and their interconnections, and prescriptive, when it comes to the regulation of be-
haviours. On a similar note, Bobbio (1976: 307) proposed a reading of jurisprudence in terms of 
the linguistic effort jurists are invited to make with the aim of “purifying”, “completing” and “or-
dering” the legislator’s language whenever the latter is not rigorous, exhaustive and systematic 
respectively. 
More recently, Mantovani (2008) called for a deeper interdisciplinary integration of legal and 
linguistic insights in the analysis of legal communication. He draws a captivating parallel be-
tween Grice’s Co-operative Principle and the phrasing of contracts. Accordingly, he proposes an 
original descriptive framework, whereby he tackles the distinctive traits of these legal documents, 
by investigating whether the conclusion of contracts may border with the main conversational 
maxims. 
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From the linguists’ perspective, the law has been an intriguing fi eld of study for a variety of 
reasons. First of all, the law represents a challenging domain of language use by virtue of its 
lexico-grammatical complexity: archaic terms, terms of art, and a whole legal argot (see Mel-
linkoff 1963; Gibbons 2003), the well-rooted practice of employing common words with uncom-
mon technical meanings (Morrison 1989), the high lexical density of sentences and the insertion 
of qualifi cations increasing the technical skills required to approach the legal text (Bhatia 1993, 
1994) are only a few examples of the attractive potential the law has constantly offered to lin-
guists as an object of study.
In second place, browsing through applied linguistics studies, it appears that scholars have of-
ten been concerned with a number of paradoxes instantiated by legal textuality. To begin with, 
drafting practices are increasingly taking account of the need to reduce the remarkably high av-
erage of sentence length; on the other hand, the attempt to condense as much information as pos-
sible into single terms to avoid unnecessary verbosity has led to the abundant use of nominaliza-
tions (Crystal/Davy 1969; Levi 1990), which sometimes increase the opacity of legal text. Addi-
tionally, the pursuit of extreme precision to achieve maximum legal certainty, achieved through 
the skilful insertion of unambiguous terms – e.g. irrevocable – is in some cases more than com-
pensated by the occurrence of fairly vague terms – e.g. reasonable – allowing the legislator to in-
clude a wide range of factual circumstances into the scope of law, and judges to exert discretion 
in interpreting the law before a dispute to be settled (Maley 1994).
Thirdly, linguists have become increasingly interested in language variation across the gen-
res of legal discourse. Rather than conceiving of legal communication as a monolith, linguists 
have paid more and more attention to the rhetorical specifi city of each genre (Swales 1990; Bha-
tia 2004) of legal discourse. Therefore, they focussed on structural and, at a deeper level, lexico-
grammatical peculiarities characterising specifi c legal text types: Trosborg (1997) brings illumi-
nating insights on contracts; Bowles (2002) deals with the discursive management of legal dissent 
among judges in judicial texts; Gibbons (2003) and Williams (2009) delve into legislative prac-
tices by referring to some of the key-guidelines of the Plain Language Movement in Australian 
and Scottish contexts respectively.
The focus of this paper is also restricted to a specifi c genre, i.e. judgments. These received a 
well-deserved consideration from legal theorists (see McCormick/Summers 1997) and argumen-
tation scholars (see Feteris 1999, 2002) by reason of their status of ‘ultimate aims’, as it were, of 
judicial activity, the apex of judicial proceedings envisaging the application of legislative norms. 
In particular, argumentation as a constitutive aspect of judgments has been pointed out by several 
scholars: Perelman (1976) singles out the historical evolution of judicial discourse, by illustrating 
that the obligation to motivate decisions, as established in the aftermath of the French Revolution, 
began to be intertwined with the pressing need to ground the interpretation of norms as equitably 
as possible after World War II, when it was clear that strict adherence to the letter of legal norms 
could produce even criminal results.  
Nonetheless, in spite of the wide recognition awarded to the increasing specifi city of judicial 
argumentation, only in recent years have linguists been undertaking a much desirable groundwork 
to explore the linguistic constituents of judicial argumentative discourse. In the light of this, this 
paper is aimed at carrying out a corpus-based analysis of the open-ended category of reformula-
tion markers in two comparable corpora of judgments issued by two different courts, namely the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities and Ireland’s Supreme Court. Reformulation is de-
fi ned by Cuenca (2003: 1071-1072) as a basic “discourse function by which the speaker re-elab-
orates an idea in order to be more specifi c” and thereby facilitates the hearer’s comprehension; 
what is more, reformulation often implies “more than a strict paraphrase”, and notably “discourse 
values such as explanation, specifi cation, generalization, implication, gloss or summary”. In other 
words, reformulation, analysed by Nigoević (2009) in legal settings, appears to be a crucial com-
ponent of legal discourse, where it may play a key-role in clarifying the scope of normative texts 
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as well as to make judicial argumentation explicit, easier to follow in its development and hence 
more convincing in legitimating the judge’s reasoning.
The paper is therefore intended to explore the main textual uses of frequent reformulation 
markers as signals of the diversifi ed functions elicited earlier on in their most extensive concept. 
As such, analysis will focus both on items traditionally associated with reformulation following 
Cuenca (2003), e.g. in other words or namely, but also on other elements that Lo Cascio (2009: 
201-208) includes among his illocutionary markers corresponding to homogeneous functions. 
More specifi cally, these items may be aimed at precising arguments or opinions – as with fi rst 
(of all) – thereby bearing the denomination “precisers” (Lo Cascio 2009: 201); alternatively, they 
may serve to better grade thoughts as well as assertions related to arguments and theses – e.g. in-
stead, rather and even – thus being labelled as “graders” (Lo Cascio 2009: 204). The methodo-
logical premises of the study are illustrated in Section 2, whereas corpus fi ndings are presented in 
Section 3 and discussed in Section 4.
2. Materials and methods
In an attempt to render analysis as reliable and rigorous as possible, the paper concentrates on a 
single genre within the broader area of legal discourse, i.e. judgments. The notion of ‘genre’ is 
taken from the scholarly contributions of Swales (1990, 2004) and Bhatia (2004), where the au-
thors point to the opportunity to design more narrowly-focussed studies on genres as classes of 
homogeneous communicative events sharing a number of properties, i.e. communicative purpose 
as established by a parent discourse community, structure, style, content and intended audience. 
In the light of this paramount acquisition of applied linguistics studies, this investigation is less a 
broader surface-level exploration of legal language than a more specifi c examination of a distinc-
tive feature, i.e. reformulation, of such a specifi c rhetorical entity within legal discourse as judi-
cial documents.
In order to provide analysis with a representative empirical basis, corpus linguistics tools were 
utilised. Corpora are defi ned as large collections of authentic texts gathered in electronic form ac-
cording to a specifi c set of criteria (Bowker/Pearson 2002; Hunston 2002), and they are generally 
used to enrich the qualitative textual remarks with suffi cient quantitative support (Stubbs 2001). 
As far as this paper is concerned, two comparable corpora were built. The fi rst one is comprised 
of 148 judgments issued by the Court of Justice of the European Communities (henceforward 
‘ECJ’), whereas the second corpus includes 34 judgments by Ireland’s Supreme Court (hereinaf-
ter ‘ISC’). The ECJ corpus amounts to 764,110 words, while the ISC corpus consists in 319,955 
words. European judgments outnumber those by the ISC, but this does not heavily threaten the 
internal balance of the corpus with regard to the distribution of the number of words, because on 
average Irish judgments are much wordier than those by the Community Court1.
The criteria for corpus design were twofold. First of all, the comparability of sources: texts 
were collected from the jurisprudence of two courts of last resort. This is intended to prevent the 
analysis from being arbitrary, because if judgments had been chosen regardless of the court for-
mulating them, one might rightly argue that the language of a court varies depending on whether 
it is a court of fi rst or of last instance. Thus, for example, the language of a decision pronounced 
by a court of fi rst instance may be shaped in a way refl ecting its attempt to successfully persuade 
courts higher up in the hierarchy of the legal system of the grounds on which the ruling itself rests. 
This aspect is obviously far from occurring in judgments issued by a court of last resort, which has 
the last word in saying what the law is. The choice of two supreme courts, therefore, undermines 
criticism due to failure to take account of features such as the one mentioned. One second crite-
1 The reasons why European judgments more than double those by Ireland’s Supreme Court are various: among oth-
ers, it may be that the EC Court is called upon to settle disputes from areas which we do not normally expect to come 
across at a national level; for instance, we would hardly believe free movement of goods, persons and capitals to be 
an issue on which the jurisprudence of a national court such as Ireland’s Supreme Court will centre, because it may be 
taken for granted that Irish citizens are allowed to move freely within the boundaries of their own State.
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rion for corpus building was the homogeneous time span, within which judgments were selected: 
the two corpora are composed of all judgments delivered by ECJ and ISC between 1st January and 
30th of June 2003.
No other criteria were set out for compiling the corpus. As a result, the jurisprudential area of 
judgments was not taken into account, in order not to reduce the reliability of the analysis, which 
would otherwise be biased owing to an unjustifi ably arbitrary choice of judgments related to one 
or more specifi c fi elds (say industrial and intellectual property) 2.
As regards methodology, corpora were studied through the main tools offered by the linguistic 
software package WordSmith Tools 5.0 (Scott 2007). As a preliminary step, reformulation mark-
ers as defi ned in Section 1 above were concordanced: Concordance is an outstanding on-screen 
function of WordSmith enabling one to have all occurrences of a certain word or phrase displayed 
at once with their most immediate yet expandable context. Thus, concordance lines were gener-
ated for the reformulation markers retrieved following Cuenca (2003) – as was the case with in 
other words, namely, that is, notably, i.e. and this means – and Lo Cascio (2009) – i.e. the “pre-
ciser” fi rst and the “graders” rather, instead and even. The choice of these items is not meant to be 
representative of all possible reformulation markers; still, if we bear in mind that other elements 
suggested by the authors whose framework is adopted – e.g. as a matter of fact and to put things 
in a different way – are not attested in any of the two corpora, the range of items selected for the 
investigation may represent a good starting point.
The systematic study of concordance lines allowed to identify some major textual functions 
performed by reformulation markers in context. Therefore, by observing the larger textual pat-
terns they occur within and/or their specifi c collocational environments (Sinclair 1996)3, it was 
possible to combine both a qualitative and a quantitative analysis. Qualitatively, the main discur-
sive operations performed by ECJ and ISC judges in reformulation were classifi ed and exempli-
fi ed: normative clarifi cation, disambiguation and specifi cation at a more general level (Section 
3.1), and consolidation of judicial argumentation (Section 3.2) more specifi cally. In quantitative 
terms, the statistical prominence of those discourse functions across the two corpora was calcu-
lated. The main fi ndings of both qualitative and quantitative analysis are presented in the upcom-
ing section. 
3. Results
Reformulation markers – as in the comprehensive view illustrated earlier on (see Section 1) – 
considered for concordance-based analysis are reported in Table 1 below with the related raw fre-
quency:
2 The criteria for corpus design mentioned in this section do not refer to the somewhat crucial issue of language, 
with special reference to the framework of EU jurisprudence. The judgments selected for the ECJ all correspond to the 
English version of those judicial documents. However, English is by no means the only offi cial language of the Court: 
rather, the language of proceedings and that of the fi rst draft of judgments is the working language of the parties (cf. 
Berteloot 1999). Whenever, therefore, the parties in the dispute are not British or Irish, the judgment is only subsequent-
ly transposed into every other Community language including English. Nevertheless, as argued in Rega (1997) and 
later on in Mazzi (2007), it is apparent that the draft of judgments follows a pre-determined pattern, a kind of template 
ensuring the homogeneity of judicial texts regardless of the original source language. Indeed, if one browsed through 
the text of ECJ judgments without knowing the parties’ name, one could not tell texts written in from those translated 
into English. 
3 Sinclair (1996) defi nes ‘collocation’ as the regular co-occurence of words, i.e. the tendency of words to go together 
with more than random probability.






ECJ ISC ECJ ISC
First 1788 386 Instead 21 9
Even 324 186 In other words 13 16
That is 234 119 Notably 2 3
Namely 156 16 I.e. 1 41
Rather 65 65 This means 2 1
Table 1. Reformulation markers and related corpus frequency (ECJ and ISC)
Obviously enough, not all corpus occurrences of the items listed in Table 1 above share the func-
tion of reformulation markers; put differently, ‘reformulation marker’ is not the only pragmatic 
category through which those elements could be classifi ed. For instance, rather would hardly be 
perceived as reformulating anything in entries such as “in a rather vague manner” (ECJ, Germany 
v. Commission), where the item fulfi ls the function of simple adjectival qualifi cation in pre-mod-
ifying position. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that percentage values expressed for 
the various discourse functions of items in this section seldom amount to 100%. 
Furthermore, in the case of outstandingly frequent markers like fi rst (1788 entries in the ECJ 
corpus alone), even and that is, concordance analysis was restricted to a sample of 150 hits4, ac-
cordingly following Hunston (2002) who postulates that the basis for quantitative corpus analysis 
lies in a step-by-step study of sets of 50-100 occurrences at a time, provided one notes no strik-
ing differences between each set of examined concordance lines. This means that corpus entries 
of those items were retrieved in completely randomised order; then, the fi rst 50 occurrences were 
analysed in order to identify any regularities in terms of the incidence of the reformulating func-
tion displayed by the item; fi nally, the operation was reiterated for a second as well as a third set 
of 50 entries, thereby coming to an end since no quantitative alterations were observed between 
the three concordance samples examined. As a result, for instance, percentage values expressed 
later on for fi rst refer to the sample considered, rather than to the whole range of nearly 2,000 to-
kens for it in the ECJ corpus, whereas all percentage fi gures referring to other items were calcu-
lated out of the full numbers reported in Table 1 above.
For the sake of clarity, this section was divided into two different sub-sections: fi rst of all, the 
general pragmatic dimensions of reformulation are illustrated in 3.1; secondly, the more chiefl y 
argumentative functions of markers are documented in 3.2.
3.1. An overview of reformulation: from normative clarifi cation to plain 
specifi cation
Corpus evidence suggests that reformulation is not a univocal entity; rather, it appears to take a 
variety of pragmatic confi gurations: from normative clarifi cation and  disambiguation, located at 
the more specialised end of the discursive spectrum, to the more general discourse function of 
specifi cation. Each of these contexts associated with the expression of reformulation in judgments 
is reviewed here.
To begin with, reformulation primarily corresponds to the judges’ attempt to clarify the norma-
tive context involved by the case. This operation is of paramount importance, because the more 
transparent the relevant law to be interpreted, the more effective and convincing judicial reason-
ing is likely to be. Normative clarifi cation is mostly realised through that is and namely, but also 
– and notably for Ireland’s Supreme Court – by means of i.e. and in other words. In the case of 
that is, normative clarifi cation concerns 48.7% of reformulating passages attested for the item in 
ECJ judgments, and 27.7% of its parallel occurrences in ISC texts. In addition, normative clarifi -
4 The only exception is represented by the 119 ISC tokens of that is, which were analysed in full because they quan-
titatively fall short of the 150-threshold taken as a benchmark.
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cation may be retrieved in 46% and 32.3% of the occurrences of namely within ECJ and ISC ju-
dicial texts respectively. In order to see normative clarifi cation at work, the following two exam-
ples are illustrative:5
(1) As regards the second method for calculating the entry price, Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation No 
3223/94 expressly provides that the entry price is to correspond to the customs value calculated in 
accordance with Article 30(2)(c) of the Community Customs Code, that is to say the unit price at 
which the imported goods or identical or similar imported goods are sold within the Community. 
(ECJ, Capespan v. Commissioners of Customs)
(2) Counsel for the Minister had argued in the High Court that in cases coming under section 5 of the Act 
upon notice of an award being given by the Tribunal claimants had three options and were obliged 
to exercise one of these in writing within one month namely: 1. to accept the award 2. to reject the 
award or 3. to appeal the award, all three options being mutually exclusive of each other. (ISC, D.B. 
v. Minister for Health)  
In (1), the ECJ judge intends to give a thorough explanation of the calculation methods for the 
‘entry price’ of goods prescribed by the normative framework of Regulation 3223/94, which in 
turn links up with Article 30 of the Customs Code. In this respect, that is (to say) fulfi ls the func-
tion of making the meaning of the clause preceding it – ‘the entry price is to correspond to the 
customs value calculated in accordance with Article 30(2)(c) of the Community Customs Code’ – 
more transparent and explicit. As such, the reader promptly understands that establishing the price 
pursuant to the letter of the Customs Code is equivalent to considering the ‘unit price’ at which 
the relevant goods are sold in the EU territory. 
Similarly, the Irish judge in (2) expatiates on the arguments put forward by the Counsel for the 
Minister as the case had been submitted to the High Court’s attention at a previous stage of the 
history of proceedings. More specifi cally, the judge goes back to the Counsel’s reasoning in so far 
as it referred to ‘section 5’ of relevant legislation, whereby it is provided that claimants have to 
choose among three different ‘options’. The latter are both enumerated and extensively listed af-
ter the reformulation signal namely.
Despite their somewhat restricted number of occurrences, the same discourse function can be 
identifi ed for i.e. and in other words – 41.3% and 81.25% of the respective entries in ISC judg-
ments. It does not necessarily follow from this that ECJ texts bear no trace of such a use of those 
two elements; as it happens, however, no signifi cant quantitative estimates can be made for Eu-
ropean judgements, where i.e. occurs just once and in other words exclusively corresponds to the 
next function explored in this sub-section, namely plain specifi cation. In (3) and (4) below, an ex-
ample for i.e. and in other words drawn from the ISC corpus is provided. In the fi rst one, the judge 
sets out the key-passages of Section 26 of the legislation in question in great detail; by contrast, in 
extract (4) he/she uses in other words to fully explore the arguments of one of the parties, namely 
the ‘plaintiffs’, whose representatives alleged that the challenged interpretation of the Aliens Act 
was unconstitutional, a view the judge him/herself eventually refutes: 
(3) Under the provisions of S.26, that was an executive function, and remained an executive function, 
vested in the manager. The passing of the resolution constituted a valid direction by the elected 
members which obliged the manager to perform a particular act which he was empowered to do, i.e., 
the making of a decision to grant permission for the development in question. Where an application 
for permission was made under S.26 of the 1963 Act then, unless the manager decided to refuse the 
application, there followed of necessity, in a case where no appeal was brought to An Bord Pleanala, 
the exercise by him of two executive functions, the fi rst under subsection (1), i.e., a decision to grant 
the permission and the second under subsection (9)(a)(i), i.e., the grant of the permission. (ISC, 
County Kerry v. Lovet)
(4) Mr. Gaffney SC submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that because of the very entrenched provisions 
5 For each and every example, the court and the name of the case it was taken from are reported in brackets at the end 
of selected passages. In addition, the reformulation marker whose use is examined is in bold. 
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of the family rights in the Constitution, these could not be trenched upon, in any way, by the State 
and, in particular, by the Aliens Order. He went so far as to answer a question I put, to say that if an 
alien landed in the State on one day and married the next day to an Irish citizen in the State, the State 
was required, by the Constitution, to safeguard the rights which were given to the family, and these 
could not be taken away by the Aliens Act 1935. In other words, the order made under the Aliens 
Act 1935 was unconstitutional. I cannot accept that view. (ISC, Lobe at al. v Minister for Justice)
The clarifi cation of normative contexts seems to go hand in hand with the crucial discourse func-
tion of legal disambiguation, even with a fair degree of tentativeness. As we observed in the in-
troductory section, legal drafters all too often avail themselves of fairly generic or – to account 
for their esoteric point of view – all-inclusive terms refl ecting their attempt to foresee as many le-
gal circumstances as they possibly can. From this point of view, disambiguation, i.e. the greatest 
possible care placed in avoiding an overlap of purported all-inclusiveness with exceeding obscu-
rity, would defi nitely need to be encouraged as a sound drafting practice in the judicial interpre-
tive process too.  
As far as our corpora are concerned, disambiguation generally accompanies the articulation 
of admittedly opaque terms such as ‘legitimate aims’, ‘true importance’ and ‘force majeure’ for 
ECJ judgments, and ‘right to liberty’ as well as ‘public interest’ in ISC judicial texts. Data indi-
cate that disambiguation is connected with that is (8.5% and 22.2% of reformulation occurrences 
for ECJ and ISC respectively), namely (11.7% and 6.8%) and, albeit in ISC texts only, i.e. (7.3%) 
along with the single occurrence of this means. Disambiguation can be observed at work in (5)-
(7) below:
(5) In that action, which is still extant, the Appellant contests the validity of what she calls her 
“suspension,” which is clearly a reference to the decision placing her on “administrative leave.” She 
alleges, as she puts it in the Statement of Claim in the present action, that her purported suspension 
was and is contrived, unlawful and mala fi de and an abuse of the provisions of [her] Consultancy 
Contract and that it was effected for an unlawful purpose, that is [her] permanent exclusion from the 
... Hospital at the behest of the Master, Dr Sean Daly. (ISC, Traynor v. Ryan)
(6) With respect, in the second place, to the cases of force majeure relied on by the City and SERS, 
namely the failure of the fi rst call for tenders for the structural work, the default of certain 
undertakings, the closure of roads because of bad weather and the setting up of road barriers in thaw 
conditions, and the strike which affected the site, it must be recalled that under French law, which 
applies to the framework contract, the concept of force majeure is characterised by three constituent 
elements, namely that it must be external, unforeseeable and irresistible. Whether the facts relied 
on constitute force majeure must therefore be determined by reference to those three criteria. (ECJ, 
Parliament v. SERS) 
(7) Finally, Lord Goff questioned whether Lord Lloyd was justifi ed in omitting from the test in the 
case of a primary victim what might be described as the “reasonable fortitude” factor, i.e., whether 
the defendant, in a case such as Page -v- Smith, ought reasonably to have foreseen that the plaintiff 
would have suffered a particular psychiatric reaction which would not have followed in the case of 
a person endowed with “normal fortitude” or “ordinary phlegm”. (ISC, Fletcher v. Commissioners 
of Public Works)
The three instances reported above suggest why disambiguation is sometimes controversial, or, as 
we rather cryptically put it, tentative. In (5), one has a general impression that disambiguation is 
fully achieved: in resuming the main arguments upheld by the appellant, the ISC judge fi rstly in-
troduces complex terms such as ‘unlawful purpose’ and ‘mala fi de’. Yet he/she immediately pro-
ceeds to disambiguating the most relevant of the two, namely ‘unlawful purpose’, the haziness 
of which is dissipated by the occurrence of that is leading to an overt reformulation of the notion 
with reference to the facts of the case: the unlawful purpose at stake is the ‘permanent exclusion’ 
from the hospital.
In (6) and (7), conversely, a few doubts could be harboured as to the felicitous completion of 
the disambiguating process: in the fi rst passage, collected from an ECJ judgment, the earlier oc-
currence of namely actually clarifi es what the ‘City and SERS’ decided to adduce as cases of 
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‘force majeure’, i.e. ‘the failure of…the default of…the closure of roads…the setting up of…and 
the strike…’. Nonetheless, with the aim of relating those specifi c issues to the more abstract no-
tion of ‘force majeure’ as a legal concept, the judge arguably illustrates its constitutive aspects by 
resorting to equally ambiguous terms: ‘external’ and most of all ‘unforeseeable’ and ‘irresistible’. 
This is not to say that the judge cunningly pretends to be disambiguating, since the nature itself of 
‘force majeure’ may per se imply such a degree of generality and discretionary application that it 
cannot be effectively disclosed once and for all. 
This may hold true for (7) too: the Irish judge raises the question of the most sensible interpre-
tation of ‘reasonable fortitude’. On the one hand, the notion is safely anchored to a precedent – 
Page v. Smith – which would invite the reader to believe that he/she is substantiating its reading 
with the inherently factual dimension provided by a case. On the other hand, however, the judge 
relates the ‘reasonable fortitude factor’ to the defendant’s capability or duty to ‘reasonably fore-
see’ a psychic reaction that would not have arisen for a person exhibiting ‘normal fortitude’ or ‘or-
dinary phlegm’. In other words, what ends up reducing the disambiguating effort, here, is that the 
judge construes his view of the notion of ‘reasonable fortitude’ though its association with other 
cognate, not immediately transparent, legal constructs – e.g. ordinary phlegm. 
The two discourse functions of normative clarifi cation and disambiguation tend to share a com-
mon trait of reformulation in judicial contexts, i.e. the specifi cation of the scope of a given norm 
or notion. Matching these highly specialised uses of reformulation signals together, however, pro-
vides evidence of the discourse function of specifi cation judicial discourse has in common with 
ordinary language. By specifi cation, we mean here the transition from general to specifi c in the 
various passages of the judge’s argument. This aspect of reformulation arises for that is, namely 
and in other words, where it regards a fairly high rate of occurrences – 41.5% and 50% for that 
is in ECJ and ISC judgments respectively; 45.1% and 58.6% respectively for namely; and 100% 
(ECJ) as opposed to 18.7% (ISC) for in other words. In (8)-(10) below, plain specifi cation, as we 
might call it, is illustrated in practice:
(8) The Läkemedelsverket gave as the reason for its decision the fact that the capsules and the tablets had 
to be considered as two distinct medicinal products, both because the production methods differed 
and because the active ingredient, that is to say, omeprazole acid, of the capsules, had been replaced 
by another active ingredient in the tablets, that is to say, magnesium salt of omeprazole acid. (ECJ, 
Paranova et al. v. Läkemedelsverket)
(9) He [the learned judge] reviewed in some detail the events that passed between 16th December and 
15th March. He concluded that DEKRA were aware by 16th December of the three issues that 
became of concern to them, namely the re-test fee, the location of tests centres and the confl ict of 
interest issue. (ISC, Dekra v. Minister for the Environment)
(10) In a letter of 20 December 1994, SERS replied to the criticisms in that opinion, stating in particular 
that it had been agreed since August 1994, in other words before the invitation to tender for the 
contract for the structural work, that the undertakings for the structural work could have been 
designated by the beginning of January 1995 and that the reopening of consultations entailed a delay 
making it possible to stay well within the time-limits provided for in the framework contract, since 
the margin allowed for by SERS in relation to the objective of the contract was not used up and was 
still largely available. (ECJ, Parliament v. SERS)
In (8), the ECJ judge is summarising the main tenets of the argumentation submitted by the ‘Läke-
medelsverket’ – the Swedish Medical Products Agency involved in the dispute. In particular, the 
Agency avers that its contested decision was motivated by the distinction between capsules and 
tablets by virtue of differing production methods and the replacement of one active ingredient 
with another. In that context, the double occurrence of that is (to say) serves the purpose of pro-
spectively alerting the reader that the specifi c name of active ingredients themselves will be stat-
ed. In other words, the reformulation signal marks the textual shift from a general category (active 
ingredients) to a specifi c element (e.g. omeprazole acid).
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In (9), similarly, the Irish judge reviews the cornerstones of the reasoning elaborated by a col-
league from a lower degree of the jurisdiction. More specifi cally, we are told that the conclusion 
he arrived at was that DEKRA, i.e. one of the parties, must have become aware of three main ‘is-
sues’ concerning it: the specifi city of the issues – ‘the re-test fee, the location of tests centres and 
the confl ict of interest’ – is introduced by namely. Even more so in (10), the judge narrows a key-
stage in the background to the case, i.e. August 1994, down to the factual signifi cance it had in 
the unfolding of the controversy itself. Thus, what looks like a mere temporal expression is trans-
formed by the judge’s discourse reformulating it into a more detailed chronological clue – ‘before 
the invitation to tender…’.
In principle, one may observe that the pragmatic boundary between legal clarifi cation and dis-
ambiguation on the one hand, and general specifi cation on the other, is not so clear-cut. To a cer-
tain extent, there is a point in this claim, but as was specifi ed earlier on, the difference mainly rests 
in the specialised nature of the fi rst two functions and the ordinary function of the other, arguably 
shared with ordinary, non-judicial language too. However, it is interesting to note that the vari-
ous forms of reformulation reviewed in this section may all fi nd their place either in the judge’s 
reconstruction of the facts of the case or, even more frequently, in the combined effort to specify 
the relevant legal background and to argue the case through a balanced combination of the par-
ties’ arguments and the judges’ own voice. The next sub-section is devoted to exploring the more 
inherently argumentative contexts in which reformulation appears to operate in judicial reasoning 
across the two courts. 
3.2. Reformulation in argumentation
The presence of reformulation in the argumentative passages of judgments often coincides with 
the use of such illocution markers as the “graders” (Lo Cascio 2009: 204) rather and instead. 
These items generally follow another component of argumentative text – typically a reported ar-
gument/interpretation – which they characterise, precise or grade. As regards rather, this can be 
noted in 46.2% of attested ECJ occurrences, and 49.3% of ISC entries:
(11) However, as the Advocate General noted in point 24 of his Opinion, the question in this case is not 
whether the Netherlands legislation guarantees greater protection for workers than that offered by 
the Directive but rather whether or not that legislation runs counter to the requirements of that 
Directive, including the order of priority given to the two alternatives provided for in Article 7. (ECJ, 
Commission v. Netherlands)
(12) While the Gardaí may have been satisfi ed in their own minds that their belief that they saw the 
applicant getting out of a stolen car in the early hours of the morning, attempting to leave to 
scene and ultimately assaulting the Gardaí was suffi cient to obtain a conviction, I would strongly 
emphasise that that is not the test. The question is not whether the Gardaí might want to use any 
available evidence, or might wish to assist the Director of Public Prosecutions by producing it, but 
rather whether this evidence, even if it is not to be used by the prosecution, could be of assistance 
to the defence. (ISC, McKeown v. Judges of the Dublin District Court et al.)
In both (11) and (12), judges take up the core of a reported statement about the interpretation of 
the issue to be settled in order to precise its scope. In (11), the ECJ judge aligns him/herself with 
the core of the Advocate General’s opinion in that the actual question to be tackled is ‘whether 
or not’ a specifi c piece of legislation is incompatible with the requirements of a directive: this in-
terpretation is introduced as a reformulation of what would be a misleading reading of the case – 
‘whether the Netherlands legislation guarantees…’ – by means of rather. In (12), the case seems 
to revolve around factual evidence to be used in proceedings: the ISC judge redresses a somewhat 
inadequate conclusion drawn from the Gardai’s investigative remarks (‘…their belief that…was 
suffi cient to obtain conviction’), notably that they may be legitimately willing to use available ev-
idence. As a result, he/she expresses the purportedly correct interpretation of the issue as a refor-
mulation of that inference, realised through rather (…‘but rather whether this evidence…could 
be of assistance to the defence’). 
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The use of instead in terms of this reformulation strategy can be observed in 14.3% and 55.5% 
of ECJ and ISC occurrences respectively. A more assertive role is played by both rather and in-
stead in so far as the two ‘graders’ are employed to rectify reported argumentation by introducing 
an allegedly better argument advanced by the judge. This is less a reformulation of the points of 
the question – see (11) and (12) – than an overall dialogic reversal of the argumentative orienta-
tion of discourse: in other words, what judges do in this case is to use ‘graders’ to signal that an 
argument is being refuted and replaced by another supported by judges themselves. This may be 
noted for 24.6% and 35.4% of ECJ and ISC occurrences of rather as well as for 28.6% and 22.2% 
of ECJ and ISC occurrences of instead:
(13) A child has a personal right to the society and nurture of his parents. The latter have no personal 
right to reside in this State. The ordinary consequence of these facts is that the parents will rear and 
nurture the child elsewhere. Does the fact that a child, alone of his family, is an Irish citizen alter 
that position? The answer depends on whether the child’s right to the Society and nurture of his 
family is a right to enjoy these things in Ireland. The applicants submission seems to me to assume, 
rather than to establish, that it is. Decisions as to nurture and rearing are normally matters for the 
parents, to be taken within the scope of their abilities, resources and entitlements. The State’s right 
to restrict the exercise of family rights within the State by the deportation of a non-national parent 
of an Irish born child has already been affi rmed in Osheku and Pok Sun Shun: these cases have 
not been overruled. Accordingly it seems to me that the existence of an Irish born child does not 
fundamentally transform the rights of the parents, though it requires the specifi c consideration of 
the Minister who must reasonably be satisfi ed of the existence of a grave and substantial reason 
favouring deportation. (ISC, Lobe at al. v Minister for Justice)
(14) The contribution is not charged on the product solely because it crosses the border as such. That 
factor constitutes the essential feature of a charge having an effect equivalent to a customs duty 
which distinguishes it from an internal tax within the meaning of Article 95 of the Treaty […] 43. 
Instead, the contribution forms part of a general system of taxation which, in principle, is applied 
uniformly, in particular in respect of the rate and chargeable event thereof, to Greek agricultural 
products alone, whether they are intended for the domestic market or for export, and which is used to 
fund a public body responsible for the prevention of, and compensation for, damage caused to Greek 
agricultural holdings by natural risks […] In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the question 
must be that Community law on the free movement of goods, in particular Articles 9, 12, 16 and 
95 of the Treaty does not preclude a quasi-fi scal charge such as the contribution.  (ECJ, Freskot v. 
Elliniko Dimosio)
In (13), the Irish judge is taking the applicant’s submissions into account. The critical standpoint 
adopted by the judge becomes evident as he openly questions the acceptability of the applicant’s 
argument by pointing out that they merely assume a particular state of things, rather than con-
cretely establishing it (‘The applicants submission seems to me to assume, rather than to estab-
lish, that it is’). In this respect, rather is the signal that marks the textual transition to the opposing 
argumentation formulated in the upcoming propositions and leading to the conclusion introduced 
by the inferential connective accordingly (‘Accordingly, it seems to me that…’). 
In (14), the ECJ is addressing part of the line of argument chosen by one of the parties. Here 
again, the Court expresses a negative evaluation about that: linguistically, this is done fi rst of all 
through negation in the verb phrase – ‘the contribution is not charged…’ – and secondly by way 
of a straightforward counter-argumentation prefaced by instead. Therefore, the ‘grader’ serves the 
purpose of opening up the Court’s argumentation – ‘…the contribution forms part…’ – in view of 
the forthcoming conclusion that the disputed contribution is not precluded by the framework of 
EC legislation (‘In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the fi rst question must be…’).
The introduction of the judge’s/Court’s argumentation is frequently intertwined with its discur-
sive consolidation operated mainly by even and, to a lesser extent, fi rst. There is strong evidence 
that even strengthens the judge’s reasoning in three main respects. First of all, the item can be used 
to assert the judicial interpretation provided for a set of relevant norms (44% and 35% of ECJ 
and ISC occurrences); in second place, even may consolidate the judge’s argumentation by push-
ing it to its extreme consequences (31% and 33% in ECJ and ISC respectively); fi nally, even also 
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appears to be used in order to take a signifi cant counter-argument into account, before the judge 
dismantles it (25% and 20% in ECJ and ISC corpus respectively). These three key argumentative 
uses of even are respectively illustrated in (15)-(18) below:
(15) It follows that any pecuniary charge, whatever its designation and mode of application, which is 
imposed unilaterally on goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier and is not a customs 
duty in the strict sense constitutes a charge having an equivalent effect to a customs duty within the 
meaning of Articles 23 EC and 25 EC, even if it is not imposed on behalf of the State (see, inter alia, 
Case 158/82 Commission v Denmark [1983] ECR 3573, paragraph 18; and Case 18/87 Commission 
v Germany [1988] ECR 5427, paragraph 5). (ECJ, Commission v. Germany)
(16) Even if I came to the conclusion that the relevant question in this case was not was there a duty 
of care to prevent the kind of damage claimed but rather was damage of that kind recoverable for 
breach of such a duty of care, I would still be of opinion that the respondents in this case would 
not be able to rely to any great extent on Page v. Smith. (ISC, Fletcher v. Commissioners of Public 
Works)
(17) As is clear from my judgment I take the view that D.B. was precluded from appealing once he 
accepted the award and that, therefore, the question of extension of time does not arise. I also take 
the view that even if I were wrong about that and that there was a right of appeal it could not be 
brought because there was a statutory time limit and the claimant brought his appeal outside of that 
time limit. Finally, I would be of the view for the reasons which I have given that the Tribunal did 
have locus standi. I would, therefore, allow the appeal on all three grounds. (ISC, D.B. v. Minister 
for Health)  
In (15), the Court decides to cite its infl uential case law – ‘see, inter alia, Case…’ – in order to 
ground its conclusion – ‘It follows that…’ – bearing on the interpretation of Articles 23 and 25 of 
the EC Treaty applied to the case in question. Even reinforces the interpretation advocated by the 
Court, since the view that ‘any pecuniary charge’ imposed on goods crossing borders is equiva-
lent to a customs duty is even extended to the case where it is not ‘imposed on behalf of the State’.
In (16), the Irish judge asserts the validity of his/her conclusion, by asseverating that should he 
take his/her reasoning to the extreme circumstance that the ‘relevant question’ of the case had in 
fact been another – ‘even if I came to the conclusion that…’ – he/she would still retain the opin-
ion that the respondent was not entitled to rely on Page v. Smith as a relevant precedent. In (17), 
fi nally, the judge temporarily takes account of the competing argument that he/she might have 
been wrong and therefore there could have been ‘a right of appeal’; he/she then refutes it on the 
grounds that there is a statutory time limit in force, and the claimant did not comply with that re-
quirement in his/her attempt to bring the appeal beyond the legal deadline. Once again, even is 
skilfully used by the judge, who consolidates his/her argumentation by showing that he/she is per-
fectly aware of the objections and counter-arguments that may be addressed to his decision. He 
thus lays emphasis on the conclusion he reached, because the latter seems to have arisen out of a 
careful balance of the various factors at play in the adjudicating process. 
Finally, corpus data indicate that the consolidation of the judge’s argumentation is also related 
to some of the countless occurrences of fi rst. Among those where the item is not used to introduce 
simple enumerations, fi rst serves to bring the strongholds of judicial arguments to the forefront. 
This was observed in 36.8% of non-enumerative occurrences of fi rst in ECJ judgments, and 4.4 % 
of its total entries in ISC texts. Quite interestingly, fi rst mainly collocates with meta-argumenta-
tive verbs (Stati 2002) such as argue, observe, hold, note and submit in both corpora: 
(18) In those circumstances, the Commission brought the present proceedings. Substance. It should be 
noted fi rst of all that under the system established by the Regulation all the competent authorities to 
which notifi cation of a proposed shipment of waste is addressed must check that the classifi cation 
by the notifi er is consistent with the provisions of the Regulation and object to a shipment which 
is incorrectly classifi ed (Case C-6/00 ASA [2002] ECR I-1961, paragraph 40). If the competent 
authority of dispatch considers that the purpose of a shipment has been incorrectly classifi ed in 
the notifi cation, the ground for its objection to the shipment must be the classifi cation error itself, 
without reference to one of the specifi c provisions of the Regulation setting out the objections 
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which the Member States may make to a shipment of waste (ASA, cited above, paragraph 47). 
(Commission v. Luxembourg)
Example (18) above shows that fi rst is typically embedded in the formula fi rst of all as it performs 
the discourse function introduced above. In the central passage reproduced in the example, the 
Court discusses the substance of the case after recalling the arguments advanced by the parties, 
in particular the Commission. It is signifi cant that the Court constructs its own reasoning on the 
basis of a legal principle derived from case law, notably ‘Case C-6/00’: in order to highlight that 
that is the turning point from which its argumentation will unfold, the Court prefaces its remark 
through the combination of it should be noted and fi rst of all as an intensifi er making it clear that 
the following propositional material accounts for the starting point of the argumentative device 
set into motion.  
4. Conclusions
The fi ndings presented in Section 3 bring concrete insights as to the important role played by re-
formulation in the unfolding of legal discourse within judicial settings. Data reveal that far from 
being a mono-dimensional undifferentiated aspect of judgments, reformulation deserves to be 
considered as a central component of judicial language; this is by virtue of the variety of discur-
sive confi gurations that reformulation markers may be observed to activate. Accordingly, it is in-
teresting to note that in spite of differences pertaining to frequency tout-court – e.g. 156 occur-
rences of namely in ECJ texts as opposed to the 16 entries attested for it in ISC judgments – and 
the related correspondent percentage discrepancies – 100% of, say, a dozen occurrences is only 
apparently higher than 18.7% derived from a set of approximately two hundred corpus entries 
– there is essential homogeneity between the two courts in terms of the discourse functions per-
formed by reformulation signals.
In this respect, both corpora indicate that the range of selected markers analysed here con-
verges around a hub of key-functions stretching on a cline between the more specialised ones – 
notably normative clarifi cation and disambiguation – to more borderline cases overlapping with 
plain language such as specifi cation (Section 3.1). As we could see, reformulation acts as a turn-
ing point for the judge’s attempts to make the relevant legislative background alongside the facts 
of the case explicit. Moreover, there is convincing evidence that reformulation is intertwined with 
the development of judicial argumentation, thereby embellishing the rhetoric of judges with con-
siderable care placed on pushing argument to its extreme consequences and/or taking concurring 
let alone competing arguments into account (Section 3.2). What emerges is therefore that refor-
mulation strengthens the quality of both judicial narrative – as is clear from its deployment in clar-
ifying the normative background and specifying the factual framework of disputes – and at once 
judicial argument, when judges characterise, refi ne or grade reported arguments/interpretations or 
they wish to make their reasoning more solid and convincing. 
A sound integration of the empirical study designed in the paper would be represented by a 
round of consultations between linguists and operators from the fi eld (see Bhatia 1993, 2004). 
The aim would be to verify to what extent judges and drafters are actually aware of the discur-
sive potential brought about by full mastery of reformulation strategies at all the levels identifi ed 
in the paper. On the one hand, it could be hypothesised that there must be increased sensitivity 
about issues like reformulation, because one of the tenets of the Plain Language Movement (Gib-
bons 2003; Williams 2009) has been to narrow the gap between the specialised concerns of the le-
gal profession and ordinary, laymen language, as it were. On the other hand, there is more than a 
hunch that judges do not entirely exploit the room for improved clarity and explicitness offered by 
reformulation, as was evident from the remarks in Section 3.1 on disambiguation. In some cases, 
it appears that the disambiguating effort does not produce satisfactory results, because it merely 
appears to relate somewhat opaque legal notions to one another, and it therefore reduces the ac-
cessibility of the judicial text.
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A question worth asking legal professionals is how they would see enriching the legal train-
ing law students receive at Universities, particularly at a post-graduate level, with a language pro-
gramme specifi cally tailored on the profi le they intend to take on as legal operators, whether law-
yers or judges. As regards judges, language workshops and seminars could be organised in order 
to enhance more systematic knowledge of the importance of issues like reformulation, the typol-
ogy of reformulation markers and, most notably, the contexts in which these are used in the nar-
rative or argumentative steps of judicial text. 
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